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C. Rationale for Prohibiting Child Pornography

Although Ferber announced five reasons that supported the exclusion of child pornography from constitutional protection,[185] the primary thrust of these rationales was this: Child pornography must be prohibited because of the harm done to children in its production. [186] The speech lacks First Amendment protection because its creation requires a crime, the abuse of an actual child. [187]  

This notion that the production of child pornography requires an act of child abuse is the key to the Court's jurisprudence. The rationale explains, for example, the Court's dramatic departure from the strictures of obscenity law in the child pornography cases: its refusal to make an exception for works of "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," [188] which is a central concern in obscenity cases, or to consider

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works as a whole rather than isolated passages. [189] If the point of the law is to protect children from abuse in the production of pornography, the Court reasoned, it seems irrelevant whether the resulting work has artistic value. [190]  

In Osborne v. Ohio, the Court extended the reach of child pornography law in its decision to uphold the criminalization of mere possession as opposed to distribution or production of child pornography.[191]
Once again, the Court relied on the unique rationale underlying child pornography law in justifying both the decision and the rejection of a basic tenet of obscenity law: Privacy rights protect the individual possessor of obscenity in his own home, even though the material he possesses would be illegal to make or sell.
[192]
All of these doctrinal turns in child pornography law were necessary according to the Court because child pornography, unlike adult obscenity, springs from a grievous harm.
[193]  

Yet, two developments in child pornography law have departed from this essential basis and have significantly extended the foundation upon which the law is built.

The first departure was made by the Court itself,
the second by Congress.

In Osborne, the Court introduced an entirely new rationale for banning child pornography: Pedophiles may use it to seduce new victims or to convince children to submit to sexual violation. [194]

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Until Osborne, it was unheard of in modern First Amendment law that speech could be banned because of the possibility that someone might use it for nefarious purposes. [195]

Congress also departed from the rationale of child pornography law when it passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996. [196]

The law responded to a technological innovation, the development of virtual child pornography – wholly computer-generated images. Although it is possible to view this innovation as a means of circumventing the problem of child abuse that was previously required for the production of child pornography, Congress chose another position.
It outlawed under the rubric of child pornography law materials that appear to be (but are not) depictions of children engaged in sexual conduct. [197] According to Congress, such child pornography, even though it is made without the use of real children, must be prevented because it "inflames the desires of child molesters, pedophiles, and child pornographers" [198] and "encourages a societal perception of children as sexual objects." [199]

We can debate whether that law is good policy. What is certain, however, is that it is a total departure from the basis of child pornography law - the abuse of children in the production of the material - as the Supreme Court devised it. The law has so far withstood constitutional challenge in the First Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit; in December of 1999, the Ninth Circuit struck it down. [200]

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