Notes
Angelides, Feminism ..., 2004


2. Gordon notes how “radical feminist consciousness pulled incest [and child sexual abuse more generally] out of the closet” (“Politics of Child Sexual Abuse,” 56). There are, of course, multiple feminist positions regarding child sexual abuse and child sexuality.
   In this essay, when I speak of the “feminist discourse of child sexual abuse,” I refer to that loose assemblage of feminist psychologists, social workers, sociologists, and other health care professionals in the area of child sexual abuse whose discursive fields are united around a radical feminist–inflected model of power and consent. In this model, feminist assumptions join forces with the conventional liberal state position in what has become the hegemonic cultural perspective, in which children are incapable of giving informed consent to sex until certain arbitrarily set ages (usually between sixteen and eighteen).
   For an analysis of radical feminist and antipornography feminist assumptions regarding child sexuality and intergenerational sex see Pat Califia, “The Aftermath of the Great Kiddy-Porn Panic of ’77,” in Public Sex: The Culture of Radical Sex (San Francisco: Cleis, 1994), 53–70.


   For discussion and references to child sexuality in the decades prior to the 1980s see Jenkins, Moral Panic; and Fishman, “History of Childhood Sexuality.”


31. While it is beyond the scope of this essay to engage in a rigorous deconstruction of the notions of power, coercion, agency, and freedom that are found in the discourse of child sexual abuse, it is that discourse’s reliance on these concepts that enables its own deconstruction.

32. With the former phrase Finkelhor is actually referring to sexual relationships between therapists and their clients, not between adults and children. However, he regards this example as analogous to the adult-child sexual encounter:
“There may be many instances where patients benefit from sex with their therapist. But the argument that such sex is wrong does not hinge on the positive or negative outcome. Rather, it lies in the fundamental asymmetry of the relationship. A patient, I would argue, cannot freely consent to have sex with a therapist” ("What’s Wrong with Sex?” 695).


34. Herman and Hirschman, “Father-Daughter Incest,” 751, 748.


   “recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child or children (generally age 13 years or younger).” The pedophile must be at least sixteen and at least five years older than the child.

40. See Herman and Hirschman, Father-Daughter Incest, 27; and Finkelhor, “What’s Wrong with Sex?” 695.

41. Finkelhor, “What’s Wrong with Sex?” 696.

42. Burgess and Groth, “Sexual Victimization of Children,” 79.

43. Summit, “Child Sexual Abuse,” 182.

44. Herman and Hirschman, Father-Daughter Incest, 206. Finkelhor at least concedes that “implicit coercion is present in many, if not most, sexual encounters in our society.” However, by relying on a carelessly examined notion of “free will,” and by making a spurious distinction between coercion and power, he reaches the same conclusion,
namely, that where there is an “inherent power differential,” the sexual encounter is wrong (“What’s Wrong with Sex?” 696).

45. This radical feminist theorizing reaches its apotheosis in the work of Sheila Jeffreys, *Anticlimax: A Feminist Perspective on the Sexual Revolution* (London: Women’s, 1990). It is far from obvious what, if anything, “equality,” “knowledge,” and “consent” have to do with our desire for sex or with the pleasure of sex. For this point I am grateful to an anonymous GLQ reader.

46. The problem is that too many feminist theorists working in the area of child sexual abuse erroneously assume that because adults are usually physically stronger than children, they possess power and children lack it. This is a simplistic notion of power, which Foucault rightly subjected to serious critique in *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1980). That children exercise power in myriad subtle ways in their relationships with their parents and other adults is glaringly apparent to anyone who observes the interactions between children and adults, and the same has been demonstrated in psychoanalytic, psychiatric, and psychological research with children and adults for nearly a century. Further, one consistent finding of research on victims of child sexual abuse who were not physically forced into submission is that often they felt a sense of power in the encounter. Although some might argue that this response is merely a “defense against the child’s feelings of utter helplessness” (Herman and Hirschman, “Father-Daughter Incest,” 751), such a conclusion warrants extreme caution, not to mention more sophisticated analyses of power. I should also point out that no two adults are in a relation of equivalence with respect to power.


48. In fact, this is true of relations, sexual or otherwise, between any two subjects.


50. Terry Leahy argues that to

“separate sexual contacts from other child/adult interactions a missing premise must be supplied that shows that sex is unlike other forms of interaction between adults and children and that this difference implies that differences of power and knowledge make interaction evil in the case of sex while in other cases adult/child interactions can be beneficial” (“Sex and the Age of Consent: The Ethical Issues,” *Social Analysis* 39 [1996]: 30).


54. A common finding of research on child sexuality is that it scarcely differs from adult sexuality. In a footnote appended to “Infantile Sexuality” in 1920, Freud argues that

   “there is, of course, no need to expect that anatomical growth and psychical development must be exactly simultaneous”


Moreover, as he states in “The Sexual Enlightenment of Children” (1907), “except for his reproductive power, a child has a fully developed capacity for love long before puberty; and it may be asserted that the ‘mystery-making’ [i.e., lack of information and education] merely prevents him from being able to gain an intellectual grasp of activities for which he is psychically prepared and physically adjusted” (PFL, 7:176).

After summarizing more recent research on child sexuality, Constantine argues that “nothing in the preceding summary supports the notion that child sexuality is in any fundamental way different from adult sexuality” (“Child Sexuality,” 61).

Ronald Goldman and Juliet Goldman also claim that the

“evidence is that earlier experience and understanding of sexuality [are] well within the moral competence of children”


55. With regard to intergenerational sex, Kincaid says that the

“question is not the redistribution of power but its adequacy in the first place, its limitations as a tool for understanding and for living” (*Child-Loving*, 25).

56. Finkelhor, “What’s Wrong with Sex?” 696.

57. Herman and Hirschman, *Father-Daughter Incest*, 42.


59. See also Rush, *Best Kept Secret*, 149.

61. In an influential book Susan Forward and Craig Buck appear to rely heavily on the Freudian theory of infantile sexuality. Despite arguing that “incestuous desires are at the core of human psychology,” however, they downplay the inevitable and mutually constituting relationship between child and adult sexualities:

“Oedipal desires are symbolic emotional desires and indistinct physical urges, rather than specific incestuous scenarios. The very young child does not specifically want to have intercourse with his mother. He wants her undivided attention; he wants to possess her; he wants her to do the things that give him pleasure and that arouse him. If he were older these desires would be sexual urges, but in his infancy and early childhood they are unfocused” (Betrayal of Innocence: Incest and Its Devastation [New York: Penguin, 1981], 7).

Even if this conjecture is true, it fails to explain how such supposedly unfocused desires work to constitute adult sexuality. It is through the retranscription of these desires — that is, through infantile sexuality — that adult sexuality is formed. The two cannot be separated.

62. For instance, it is rare for a child to be described as gay or lesbian, even in biologically determinist discourses.


63. See


In the child sex abuser literature, normative child sexuality is poorly defined and often construed as “sex play.”

Again, this reflects the increasing desexualization of childhood. As Cantwell reveals:

“It is not clear to what extent sexual play among children is normal. Normal might be better defined but includes ‘looking,’ curiosity about another child’s genitalia with mutual undressing. However, oral-genital contact and penetration of the vaginal/anal opening with fingers or objects is probably abnormal” (“Child Sexual Abuse,” 581).


69. Herman and Hirschman, *Father-Daughter Incest*, 9, 10.


> “Freud could never resign himself to treating phantasy as the pure and simple outgrowth of the spontaneous sexual life of the child. He is forever searching, behind the phantasy, for whatever has founded it in its reality: perceived evidence of the primal scene . . . ; the seduction of the infant by its mother . . . ; and, even more fundamentally, the notion that phantasies are based in the last reckoning on ‘primal phantasies’ — on a mnemonic residue transmitted from actual experiences in the history of the human species. . . . quite obviously, the first stage — the stage of the scene of seduction — simply must be founded in something more real than the subject’s imaginings alone”


73. Sigmund Freud, “Female Sexuality” (1931), in PFL, 7:379.

74. Freud, “Infantile Sexuality,” in PFL, 7:108. As Freud said elsewhere,

> “Phantasies of being seduced are of particular interest, because so often they are not phantasies but real memories”


78. Herman and Hirschman, “Father-Daughter Incest,” 737.

79. Summit, “Child Sexual Abuse.”

80. John W. Pearce and Terry D. Pezzot-Pearce, Psychotherapy of Abused and Neglected Children (New York: Guilford, 1997), 305.


83. Pearce and Pezzot-Pearce, Psychotherapy, 306.

84. The therapeutic discourse of child sexual abuse tends problematically to conflate, or to use as if interchangeable, the concepts of causation and responsibility. Saying that a child made decisions that contributed to the complex causal dynamics of an abusive situation is not the same as saying that the child was responsible for that abuse.

85. Whether from a poststructuralist or a psychoanalytic (or a poststructuralist psychoanalytic) position, reality and fantasy are two sides of the same coin of human perception.

86. Herman and Hirschman, “Father-Daughter Incest,” 751.

87. Wieland, Techniques, 27. Herman and Hirschman argue that a child’s “sense of malignant power can be understood to have arisen as a defense against the child’s feelings of utter helplessness” (“Father-Daughter Incest,” 751).


For a discussion of sex education’s avoidance of the question of pleasure in relation to the sexual activity of youth see Levine, *Harmful to Minors*, 90–116.

See Ponton, *Sex Lives*.

With the publication of *Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality*, ed. Carole S. Vance (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), prosex feminists made an important intervention into American discourses of sexuality at a time when they were being influentially shaped by radical feminist theories. Aiming to offer a more balanced picture of female sexuality than the radical feminist one, in which heterosexuality was often portrayed as inherently patriarchal and thus “dangerous” to and oppressive of women, prosex feminists insisted on a focus not only on sexuality and danger but also on sexuality and pleasure. In my view, representing sexuality, if only in part, through the concept of danger all too often reinforces moralistic and normative discourses of good and bad sex. It might be more productive to view sexuality and pleasure against the backdrop of risk.


100. Although the Freudian model of sexuality incorporated elements of linear and sequential logic, it problematized them with its emphasis on such concepts as deferred action, repetition compulsion, and unconscious fantasies.

101. See
   - Tim Dean, *Beyond Sexuality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000);
   - Tim Dean and Christopher Lane, “Homosexuality and Psychoanalysis: An Introduction,” in *Homosexuality and Psychoanalysis*, ed. Tim Dean and Christopher Lane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 3–42; and


103. A queer psychoanalytic theory might also begin to theorize child sexuality by rethinking Freud’s notion of polymorphous perversity through the analytic axis of age. In this way queer theory might begin to give greater attention to the ways that sexual object choice is determined not only or primarily by gender but also by age.


107. In “Thinking Sex” Rubin argued that “gender affects the operation of the sexual system, and the sexual system has had gender-specific manifestations. But although sex and gender are related, they are not the same thing, and they form the basis of two distinct arenas of social practice. . . . I am now arguing that it is essential to separate gender and sexuality analytically to reflect more accurately their separate social existence” (33).


112. In “Thinking Sex” Rubin argues for a radical theory of the politics of sexuality that will attend to the issues of child sexuality and intergenerational sex. She explains our culture’s abhorrence of intergenerational sex as the result of a sex-negative and normative framework that views almost all forms of sexuality within a hierarchy of acceptability. At the top is married, monogamous, reproductive, heterosexual sex, with other sexual variations plotted down the hierarchy. *There are at least two problems with this model.*

*First,* there is the very concept of a hierarchy. While certain forms of heterosexuality are indeed often valued above all other variations of sexuality, this has not been the case in all texts, discourses, or historical periods. To be fair, Rubin does identify the idea of social and political struggles over “where to draw the line” as a crucial factor in the different social and historical forms that the hierarchy takes (14). *However,* the model must be more complex than a hierarchy of “good versus bad sex,” with which it is difficult to analyze the intermingling, or relational, aspects of “good” and “bad.” This hierarchy also does not take into account other factors that may condition or intersect with sex and sexuality or that provide the context for sexual encounters.

- How, for example, would this model account for ideas such as love, truth, and honesty?
- Does married, monogamous, heterosexual sex in which both partners secretly fantasize about a family friend rate above monogamous, homosexual sex?
- Is married, monogamous, heterosexual sex without love better than loving, monogamous homosexual sex?
- Is married, monogamous, heterosexual sex between a seventy-year-old man and an eighteen-year-old girl of greater or lesser value than consenting sadomasochistic sex?

The very fact that battles over “where to draw the line” mean that the line itself moves suggests that a hierarchy is never simply a hierarchy. It is such only by virtue of the horizontal relations established in it. This kind of hierarchy is not a useful way of understanding the range of factors responsible for our culture’s resistance both to child sexuality and to intergenerational sex. *Second,* the sex hierarchy model has a built-in bias toward seeing the logic of heteronormativity as determining the scale of values. Again, when child sexuality is at stake, often the issue of hetero- or homosexuality is secondary, if not irrelevant, to the framing of value.

113. I scarcely need to point out how an individual can be simultaneously deemed a child in one discursive regime and an adult in another.