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A New Solution to the Recovered Memory Debate;
Perspectives on Psychological Science 2009;
4(2), 126-134
The controversy regarding recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) has been characterized by two perspectives.
[1] According to one perspective, some people repress their memories of abuse because these experiences have been so emotionally traumatic, and they become capable of recalling the CSA only when it is psychologically safe to do so many years later.
[2] According to the other perspective, many reports of recovered memories of sexual abuse are false memories, often inadvertently fostered by therapists.
In this article, we provide evidence for a third interpretation that applies to a subset of people reporting recollections of CSA; it does not require the concepts of repression, trauma, or false memory. These people did not experience their CSA as traumatic; they either failed to think about their abuse for years or forgot their previous recollections, and they recalled their CSA spontaneously after encountering reminders outside of psychotherapy. Their recovered memories are corroborated at the same rate as those of people who never forgot their abuse. Hence, recalling CSA after many years is not the same thing as having recalled a previously repressed memory of trauma.
The controversy regarding recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) has been characterized by two perspectives.
[1] According to one perspective, some people repress their memories of abuse because these experiences have been so emotionally traumatic, and they become capable of recalling the CSA only when it is psychologically safe to do so many years later.
[2] According to the other perspective, many reports of recovered memories of sexual abuse are false memories, often inadvertently fostered by therapists.
In this article, we provide evidence for a third interpretation that applies to a subset of people reporting recollections of CSA; it does not require the concepts of repression, trauma, or false memory. These people did not experience their CSA as traumatic; they either failed to think about their abuse for years or forgot their previous recollections, and they recalled their CSA spontaneously after encountering reminders outside of psychotherapy. Their recovered memories are corroborated at the same rate as those of people who never forgot their abuse. Hence, recalling CSA after many years is not the same thing as having recalled a previously repressed memory of trauma.
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Who needs repression?;
The Science Review of Mental health Practice, Vol. 4, Number 2, Fall-winter 2005-2006, pp 66 - 73. ,
Dec 01 2005
Who needs repression? Normal memory processes can explain 'forgetting' of childhood sexual abuse
Conclusions in short:
(1) CSA is not necessarily traumatic at the time it occurs,
(2) CSA can be forgotten via normal forgetting mechanisms, and
(3) it may be the retrospective interpretation of the event, rather than the event itself, that mediates its subsequent impact.
This article is in Ipce's Library 3 (because of the dubble frame needed for text and references) - here is the abstract and a link to the article.
Who needs repression? Normal memory processes can explain 'forgetting' of childhood sexual abuse
Conclusions in short:
(1) CSA is not necessarily traumatic at the time it occurs,
(2) CSA can be forgotten via normal forgetting mechanisms, and
(3) it may be the retrospective interpretation of the event, rather than the event itself, that mediates its subsequent impact.
This article is in Ipce's Library 3 (because of the dubble frame needed for text and references) - here is the abstract and a link to the article.
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Is the Pseudoscience Concept Useful for Clinical Psychology?;
The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice;
vol. 2, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2003), ,
Jan 01 2003
Abstract:Talented entrepreneurs have been developing and marketing novel therapeutic methods, some touted as veritable miracle cures for diverse complaints.
This phenomenon has caught the attention of scientist-practitioners in psychology, many of whom criticize these approaches as “pseudo-scientific.” The purpose of this essay is to sketch a simpler, alternative approach to debunking dubious methods in clinical psychology. When therapeutic entrepreneurs make claims on behalf of their interventions, we should not waste our time trying to determine whether their interventions qualify as pseudo-scientific. Rather, we should ask them: How do you know that your intervention works? What is your evidence?
Abstract:Talented entrepreneurs have been developing and marketing novel therapeutic methods, some touted as veritable miracle cures for diverse complaints.
This phenomenon has caught the attention of scientist-practitioners in psychology, many of whom criticize these approaches as “pseudo-scientific.” The purpose of this essay is to sketch a simpler, alternative approach to debunking dubious methods in clinical psychology. When therapeutic entrepreneurs make claims on behalf of their interventions, we should not waste our time trying to determine whether their interventions qualify as pseudo-scientific. Rather, we should ask them: How do you know that your intervention works? What is your evidence?