The Dutch text [*] is translated by Google and corrected by Ipce.
[* < https://www.jorisoost.nl/lees/ethiek/steutel_2009.html >]

JW Steutel, prof, Dr., Professor University of Amsterdam, Department of Pedagogical and Educational Sciences, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam,
e-mail: j.w.steutel @ uva.nl
Address for correspondence: JW Steutel, Department of Pedagogical and Educational Sciences, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam, email: jwsteutel@uva.nl.

The Refences are given here in a separate PDF file: steutel_2009_references.pdf

Summary

What (if anything) makes adult-child sex morally wrong? Two standard answers are given to this question. 

• The first one (the harm argument) is that sexual contacts between adults and children are wrong because they likely are harmful to the child. 
• The second one (the consent argument) localizes the wrong-making characteristic in the child’s inability to give valid consent to sex with adults. 

Both standard arguments are explained and assessed. The upshot is that both arguments are sound, but only with respect to a particular subclass of sexual contacts between adults and children. 

• The harm argument is effective only if the child is unwilling to participate in the sexual encounter, and 
• the consent argument is successful only if the child’s parents did not give the adult permission to have sex with the child. 

Consequently, both arguments fail if the child participates freely and the adult involved received parental permission. It will be argued that what makes these cases of adult-child sex morally wrong, or at least most of these cases, is the fact that if the parents had taken their role-responsibilities seriously, they would not have granted the adult permission to have sex with their child.

Introduction

You need no empirical research in order to note that most people have an aversion to sexual contact between adults and children. And this aversion is not, or not only, a form of aesthetic revulsion (yuck! tacky), but mostly, or in any case, a form of moral disapproval (Shame! intolerable!). The question is whether this is as powerful as widespread moral aversion to sex between adults and children is justified. It is one thing for certain behavior intuitively disapprove certain behavior, [Page 79] it is quite another thing to show with arguments why that behavior should be condemned. 

My question is: can we make a reasonable argument that sex between adults and children is morally wrong or morally unacceptable?
Before I go looking for an answer to this question, I will first say what I precisely specify which sexual relations between adults and children I have in mind.

Firstly, I will limit myself to have sex with children in the narrow sense of the term. In the broadest sense, the term "child" refers to anyone who is not yet mature. Childhood is the period from birth to adulthood. In the narrow sense, the term "child" for pre-teens or, perhaps slightly larger, for anyone who is not a toddler anymore but no adolescent. Then childhood roughly coincides with the primary school period. So I will disregard completely sexual contact between adults and adolescents or adolescents.

Secondly, even incest is beyond the scope of my argument. So I will concentrate only on non-incestuous sexual relations between adults and prepubers. [*1]

• [*1] My consideration to let sex between adults and adolescents and incestuous sex between adults and children out of consideration is that these forms of sex are different from non-incestuous sex between adults and prepubescent children (…). Note further that I do not use such terms as "pedophilia" or "pedosexuality", but consistently speak of sexual contact between adults and children. The reason is not only that the concerned adults do not always have a sexual orientation, but also because I see no morally relevant differences between sexual contacts of children with pedophiles and those with other adults.

I also want to specify my question a little further by using some terms and distinctions that I borrow from an article by the British philosopher CD use Broad (1940). In it he defends that the moral attributes (such as right and wrong, good and evil) are in a specific way related to non-moral characteristics.
Suppose that X has a certain moral character, where no matter what attribute that is, or whether X is a deed, a motive, a trait, a relationship or whatever it is. According to Broad X has always also non-moral characteristics and, more importantly, the moral character of X always also depends on one or more of those non-moral characteristics. In other words, if X has a moral attribute, X has non-moral characteristics that make X has the relevant moral character. For that reason, Broad has proposed such non-moral characteristics of the so called "right-making ',' wrong-making ' attributes.

Referring to the analysis of Broad, we could say that a moral aversion to sexual contact between adults and children, by definition, means that a particular moral character ascribed to such contacts, namely the characteristic of morally wrong or moral impermissibility. But that instinctive or intuitive disapproval is not in itself the beginning of an answer to the question of what exactly makes sex between adults and children morally wrong, that is what non-moral feature of such contacts the wrong-making feature. Indeed, even though we do not rule out a deep moral aversion towards such sexual contacts, is that, after careful consideration, fail to point out that with good reason as it is a non-moral attribute to wrong-making feature may be considered. We are 
not able to justify our moral disgust - and that would be a good reason not to place undue reliance on our intuitive moral compass regarding sexual contact between adults and children.

Anyway, in this normative ethical discourse, I will try to answer the question whether a non-moral characteristic of sexual contact between adults and children may be appropriate that such contact is morally wrong, and if so, of which characteristic that answer is.
I begin with a brief explanation of two standard arguments against sex between adults and children.

• Since the first argument, the wrong-making feature, locates in the damage caused to the child, I call this argument the damage argument.
• The second standard argument I shall call the consent argument, since, according to this argument, the wrong-making feature consists in the fact that the child cannot validly agree.

Then follows a discussion of this standard arguments. What I want to show above all is that both arguments are tenable only in reduced form, i.e., in a version that only covers a specific subclass of sexual contact between adults and children.

Finally, I try to point out a non-moral characteristic that leads to my opinion that all sexual contacts between adults and children are morally wrong including sexual contacts against which the standard arguments fail.

Default Arguments against sex between adults and children

The damage argument in ethical treatises of philosophers about sex between adults and children, the harm argument is invariably mentioned explicitly and often discussed and evaluated (eg Ehman, 1984; Primoratz, 1999). But unmistakably in publications in which psychologists report on empirical research into aspects of sex between adults and children plays an important role in the damage argument, even if it is generally more implicit. In these publications, such contacts are almost always referred to as 'child sexual abuse', which suggests a causal relationship between such contacts and damage to the side of the child concerned. If we want to do with the way the damage argument is understood by philosophers and psychologists is right next deductive reconstruction of 
the argument is probably the most accurate: 

[P = Premisse; C = Conclusion]

• P1 contacts between adults and children with a real risk of harm to the child in question is morally wrong, unless such contacts are necessary to prevent greater injury of the child.
• P2 Sexual contact between adults and children pose a real risk of harm to the child involved, and none of those contacts is necessary to avoid severe damage in the child.
• C. Sexual contacts between adults and children are morally wrong.

[PAGE 81]
What is usually explicitly the argument brought by supporters of the damage argument that it is only the first part of the second premise, namely that sexual relations between adults and children constitute a real risk of harm to the child involved. What therefore is not expressed or is expressed not only the first premise, but also the last part of the second premise, namely that noneof these contacts is necessary in order to prevent more serious injury to the child. But it is reasonable to assume that these elements concealed in the reasoning implicitly adopted by proponents of the harm argument.

The fact that the child is harmed by certain contacts with adults is in itself not sufficient to make such contacts morally unacceptable, because there are conditions to be designated under the harm of children by adults is not morally wrong, especially if the damage is the inevitable consequence of preventing further damage to the address of the child. It is likely that proponents of the harm argument such circumstances will admit. 

Therefore, these conditions are discounted in the first premise. And if so, is their argument against sexual contact between adults and children is not only that such contacts are associated with a real risk of harm to the child but also that none of these contacts is in the best interests of the child, or never interests of the child should be large enough to damage the child is done to compensate and thus moral legitimacy. [* 2]

• [*2 ] The term "damage" is, like the English 'harm', both in moral and in non-moral
  sense. The phrase 'X has harmed Y' may 
  [a] well mean that X has wrongd Y, or Y is wrong (moral sense), and 
  [b] mean that the behavior of X has a negative impact on the interests of Y (non-moral sense) (see Feinberg, 1984, pp. 33-35;. Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 116).
  In the second premise of the damage argument (as reconstructed by me) the term "damage" is used in non-moral sense: it is the empirical claim that there is a real chance that sex with adults has a negative impact on the interests of the child. The conclusion is a moral claim that can be in terms of 'damage' in a moral sense rephrased by sex with adults, the child is harmed, i.e. wronged or done something wrong. In terms of Broad: non-moral characteristic of damage makes the sex has the moral character of damage.

Note further that in both premises, the term 'real risk' has been added. In characterizations of damage argument is often simply stated that sex between adults and children is harmful to children. Taken literally, this would mean that the damage argument would claim that any sexual contact with an adult child harm. That is an extreme claim, arguing that it would deprive many of his persuasion. Authoritative defenders of damage argument therefore opt for a more moderate interpretation of the relationship between sex with adults and injury to the child. 

Thus, according to David Finkelhor (1984, p 16.) the high risk of such harm sufficient to justify general moral (and legal) prohibition of sexual contact between adults and children. One could still take back without damaging the strength of the argument.
Especially when the damage to the child is significant or substantial, limited risk would be enough to make sex between adults and children morally wrong. The greater the damage, the lower may be the opportunity and the lower the damage, the greater should be the chance. 

What harm does the harm argument refer to?

In recent decades, psychologists and psychiatrists highlighted numerous negative
effects of sex between adults and children, including symptoms of

• posttraumatic stress disorder,
• more or less severe depression,
• suicidal behavior,
• anxiety and panic disorders,
• obsessive-compulsive disorder,
• borderline,
• alcohol abuse and
• eating disorders.

If we find a common term for all these supposed effects are terms like "mental disorder" or "psychopathology" the most appropriate, especially when we shear behavioral disorders among these terms. The damage where the damage argument is therefore refers to the occurrence of mental illness or the occurrence of psychopathological symptoms. And this damage may occur to the child in the short term, that is, soon after sexual contact with an adult, but also occur in the longer term, that is, when the child is an adolescent has become or has become an adult. [* 3]

• [*3] Feinberg (1984, p 37) distinguishes between two classes of interests that he resp. 'ulterior interests' and 'welfare interests' calls.
  °  The first subclass consists of our long-term goals and relatively stable
  aspirations, which can be strong. Different from person to person
  °   The second subclass consists of interests that we share with virtually anyone, as these interests relate to resources necessary to achieve our goals and aspirations, of whatever nature, to realize.
  As examples of welfare interests Feinberg calls include
  °  physical health,
  °  emotional stability,
  °  the absence of groundless fears,
  °  ability to return to normal social contacts and
  °  to maintain a minimum income and
  °  a certain degree of freedom.
  Psychiatric disorders or psychopathological disorders can be regarded as more or less serious violations of welfare interests.

In empirical research on sexual relations between adults and children is often asked respondents to the way they lived. Contacts such as child have depth from memory experiences during and after the sexual contacts with adults are usually placed on a continuum that runs from (very) negative through neutral to (very) positive. Negative experiences include feelings of

• fear,
• sadness,
• disgust
• despair,
• horror,
• shame and guilt, or
• feel abused or victimized to be. 

And feelings of

• pleasure,
• excitement and adventure, and
• feel important to be found as important or
• to be in full attention

are usually scored as positive experiences.

A point of discussion is whether the negative experiences of the child as a form of damage to be understood, therefore, whether the injury argument actually refers also to such experiences. 
In his critical review of the harm argument focuses Robert Ehman (1984) almost exclusively to any psychopathological effects. Negative experiences of the child fall outside the scope of the concept of damage. That at least is reproached by Marilyn Frye (1984). According to her, Ehman uses a far too limited concept of damage, with the result that he has insufficient attention to what also needs to be considered as injury: the painful feelings or aversive experiences of kind. [*4]

• [*4] The questions that would enable Frye (1984, pp. 450-451) to the order, but she missed the article Ehman node: "How was it for her? Not: Did this, or is it likely to, result in lifelong psychosexual dysfunction? but: Was it nice? Did she have fun? Was it not soured by ambivalence, confusion, pain, feelings of powerlessness (...)? "
  Wertheimer (2003, pp. 97-100) Uses the term 'psychological distress for such negative experiences, and Frye as he considers such experiences as a type of damage ('harm'). In contrast, Feinberg (1984, pp. 45-48) will tend to look like 'hurts' such experiences and not as 'harms' (cf. also Primoratz, 1999, p 106).

I am also inclined to notice negative experiences of the child as a form of damage. After all, even the childlike experience of sexual contacts with adults is morally relevant, and may not be less relevant than the occurrence of mental disorders. 
In any case, not only the risk of psychopathology but also the way children having sex with adults should be considered in a moral assessment of such contacts. 
The second premise of the argument has therefore damage not only to forms of 
psychopathology, but also on the painful experiences of the child about the sexual contact with the adult. According to damage argument there are in fact two wrong-making characteristics of sexual contact between adults and children, namely [PAGE 83]

•  the real risk that the child will sooner or later be affected by mental disorders and
• the real risk that the child will be a negative experience.

The consent argument

Ethical considerations which both the damage and the consent argument being treated is often pronounced for the latter argument.
Take for example the argument Finkelhor (1984). Although considering that the damage argument itself is strong enough such sexual relationships inadmissible to explain, he claims that "the real extent of the wrong" or "the basic ethical issue at stake" only brought to light by the consent argument.

Another example is the treatises of Igor Primoratz (1999, 2006). He believes that the consent argument is much more robust than the harm argument. Because whether and to what extent the child is harmed by sex with adults, according to him, is "still a matter of research and debate, rather than of well-established fact" (1999, p 101.).

And in his ethical treatise on pedophilia warns Gunter Schmidt (2002) to our moral discourses', dealing with moral issues, not to be confused with 'clinical discourses', which relate to acute or persistent mental disorders. The reason why sex between adults and children is morally wrong, according to him, nothing to do with any traumatic effects but consists merely in the fact that such sex is contrary - as he calls it - "the morality of consent and negotiation".

The way the consent argument is understood, in this and other papers, we can reconstruct deductive as follows: [P = Premisse, C = Conclusion]

• P1 Sexual contacts are morally wrong if at least one of the parties has not consented.
• P2 Regarding sexual contacts with adults, children are not valid consent.
• C. Sexual contact between adults and children are morally wrong.

According to authors such as Finkelhor, Primoratz and Schmidt, the second premise concerns the wrong-making feature of sex between adults and children: even though the child has consented to such sexual contacts, which consent may not be valid, that does not mean the form of consent needed to make sex morally licit. But why are the authors mentioned this opinion? What exactly makes the consent of the child, according to them invalid?

The first premise of the argument consent refers to the core principle of liberal sexual ethics, the so-called principle of valid consent (Archard, 1998; Wertheimer, 2003).
According to that principle sexual contacts morally legitimate if, and only if, all parties
have consented valid with sex (sex and no significant damage to outsiders, nor 
unnecessarily offensive). And the consent of the parties is valid if, and only if, that consent meets the criteria of voluntary (i.e., the agreement is not the result of a form of coercion exercise, such as threats, extortion and intimidation), information (i.e. the agreement is not obtained by committing a form of cheating, for example, by manipulation, deception or fraud) and competence (i.e. the consent is given by someone who is capable enough to take wise decisions in the sexual sphere).

Based on this brief explanation of the principle of valid consent, we can pinpoint exactly why the mentioned authors believe that the child is valid cannot accept sexual contacts with adults.
Firstly, they are all three of the opinion that the consent of the child cannot meet the criterion of voluntariness.

•  Children, writes Finkelhor, will find it difficult to adults 'no' to say. (1984, p 18.) It is after all the adults who have control over many goods and resources that are important to the child, such as money, food and freedom.
• According Primoratz (1999, pp. 107-108, 2006, p 760) are inclined to adult children, purely because the adults are seen as authorities. Therefore, they will struggle to resist advances adults, 
• And Schmidt (2002, p 473.) Argues more generally that the difference in power between adults and children "endangers the child's capacity for sexual self-determination, threatening to overpower it completely."

Secondly, both Finkelhor and Primoratz believe that the knowledge and understanding of children of different aspects, social meanings and consequences of sexual contacts too limited to make their consent. Valid, since they are the inevitable deficiencies in knowledge and understanding characterized in terms of informed consent, the impression soon emerged that they have in mind here the criterion of information. However, considering my current interpretation of the principle of valid consent to the starting point, then that childlike lack of knowledge and understanding should 
rather be seen as something that their agreement does with the criterion of competence.

Contrary The point of Finkelhor and Primoratz is not that the child is deceived or misled by the adult party, but that the child by his or her lack of knowledge and understanding is incapable to make wise decisions. In fact, only explicitly claimed by Schmidt that the consent of the child usually does not meet the criterion of information requirements. The child, says Schmidt, will very soon have 'no' to hear if the adult from the outset that he would make a sexual contact. Clear for that reason, the adult will conceal his intentions, notably by allowing it in a completely different (non-sexual or child education [PAGE 85] innocent) scenario operate than is actually the case. This "element of deception,"
Schmidt writes, "is essential to fulfilling his own desire" (2002, p 475.).

So it comes down to is that proponents of the consent argument in fact appoint three non-moral characteristics that make each considered in isolation, sexual contact between adults and children morally wrong, namely

• the fact that the child's consent does not meet the criterion of voluntariness,
• the child is not competent to consent to be valid 
• and, as Schmidt argues that the consent of the child is generally inconsistent with the 
  criterion of information.

Corresponding thereto, we can distinguish three variants of the consent argument.

• What these variants in common is that the second premise an additional explanation for the fact 
• that the child's consent is invalid.
• And in which they differ is that additional explanation appeals to a different
  criterion of valid consent.

A critical assessment of the standard arguments

An evaluation of the damages claimed

To criticism of the two standard arguments did not fail. Criticism of the damage argument is not directed against the first (moral) premise, but always refers to the second (empirical) premise, more particularly in the first part of this premise. There is no doubt that if it is true that sexual relations between adults and children pose harm to the child, a real risk of these contacts should be morally forbidden - questioned only if it is true that all these contacts with the associated risk.

Since the second premise is an empirical claim, it will be no surprise that criticism of the damage argument refers to empirical research. This is done by pointing out methodological limitations of research that is relied upon in support of the second premise, for example, the fact that only been used clinical samples or correlations are wrongly presented as causal relationships. On the other hand, this is done by pointing out that no such research has yielded methodological limitations that do not support the second premise correct results.

A strong example of such research are the meta-analyzes of Bruce Rind, Philip Tromovitch and Robert Bauserman (1998).

• [< https://www.ipce.info/library_3/rbt/metaana.htm >,
• < https://www.ipce.info/ipceweb/Library/rbt_files.htm >

Their statistical analysis of the results of 59 studies among students is intended to determine how much exactly is the connection between sex between adults and children on the one hand, and damage in the form of (a total of eighteen different) psychopathological disorders on the other hand include.

And guess what? That link is indeed significant but also downright weak (Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.9). Not even one percent of the variance can be explained among students in mental disorders attributed to sexual contacts with adults in childhood.

Furthermore, let their meta-analysis shows that the development of mental disorders is stronger when students themselves say that the sex was involuntary or that they were forced to have sex. But when students report that they have participated voluntarily in the sex show that connection no longer be significant: regarding the eighteen mental disorders, these students scored no different than the control group. The researchers also have mapped how the students have experienced sex as a child (their so-called 'retrospectively recalled immediate reactions').

At this point clear gender differences exist: the percentage of positive, neutral or negative experience 

• for male students are 37, 29 and 33, while it appears that 
• the female students 11, 18 and 72 respectively.

[* What I miss is the category ‘ambivalent’: positive ánd negative both. Ambivalent is not the the same as ‘neutral’ – FG, Ipce]

Based on the results of their meta-analysis, the researchers suggest the term 'child sexual abuse' is no longer to be used for all forms of sexual contact between adults and children, but only for a certain subclass of such contacts, namely sexual contacts the child has undergone involuntary or negatively experienced. Regarding the subclass of sexual contact between adults and children that the child has voluntarily participated and who has a positive experience, the researchers propose to use the term "adult-child sex".

To prevent misunderstandings, the researchers must insist that their proposal is not intended as a moral assessment of sex between adults and children. Their concerns relate only to the scientific validity of the constructs used. Because the term 'child sexual abuse' suggests a clear link with the occurrence of damage, the term should be reserved for only those cases of sex between adults and children where that connection is also effective presence, and therefore cannot be applied to cases where the associated with psychopathological disorders completely missing - that we can better use the term "adult-child sex."

Anyway, if we can assume that the results of the examination of Rind cum suis are reliable, then the damage argument is no longer maintained. [*5]

• [*5] Methodologically, the meta-analysis by Rind et al undoubtedly one of the best research on the effects and experiences of the child or sexual contacts with adults and children. That does not mean that their publication has prompted widespread and often virulent criticism (cf. Rind, Bauserman & Tromovitch, 2000 [*]). 
  Much of that criticism is highly ideological seized, and insofar as the critique of methodological nature, we find a comprehensive and adequate reply in Rind, Tromovitch & Bauserman, 2000 [**], pp. 18-33.
  [*] < https://www.ipce.info/library_2/rbt/science_frame.htm >] 
  [**] < https://www.ipce.info/library_2/rbt/condemn_frame.htm >.

The second premise of this argument are in fact all cases of sex between adults and children accompanied by a real risk of harm to the child. But the research shows that the described real risk of harm being present only when the sexual contact on the part of the child is involuntary. 
These involuntary implies that the child will experience the negative and sex (and therefore perhaps) this is also a significant risk of mental disorders. However, if the contact of the side of the child is entered into voluntarily, it may be assumed that the child's contact positive rather than negative will experience, and lacking any significant correlation with psychopathological disorders. In other words, if the real risk of harm to the wrong-making characteristic of sexual contact between adults and children, this is not a feature of all those [PAGE 87] sexual contacts, as in the second premise of the argument is claimed damages, but only a certain subclass of such contacts, namely those contacts where the child is involved with pressure or coercion. [*6]

• [*6] What I missed in the study of Rind et al is a breakdown of the rates of voluntary and involuntary sex (and the percentages of negative, neutral and positive experiences) in children and adolescents (teenagers). Many of the studies that they have subjected to analysis, not only to sexual relations between children and adults, but also sexual contacts between adolescents and (significantly older) adults.
  Rightly argue Rind et al. for making a distinction between "adult-child sex" and "adult-adolescent sex '(and between 'child sexual abuse 'and' adolescent sexual abuse), partly because adolescents, compared with children, "are more likely to have sexual interests" (1998, p 46.). Given this increased interest in sex, one might expect that the rate of cases of consensual sex (and the percentage of positive experiences) in adolescents is significantly greater than in children. On the other hand, is evident from their meta-analysis that the maximum age that is held in the studies is not related to the measured effects (the extent to which sex is related to the occurrence of mental disorders). And that is what one would expect if the experiences of children, compared with those of adolescents, often negative and involuntary (see note 7).

We would want that the harm argument could be save by bringing to this subclass of involuntary sexual contact between adults and children, and so reduce the scope of the argument, so to speak. But it goes without saying that this constrained version of the damage argument is substantially different than the standard damage argument.

An evaluation of the consent argument

The main criticism of the consent argument concerns the first (moral) premise and not the second (empirical) premise. [*7]

[*7] Empirical research has been shown that children voluntarily (i.e., without being forced) and informed (i.e. without being deceived) to participate in sexual contact between adults and children (see, eg, Sandfort, 1984, Okami, 1991).
Effective criticism of the second premise, however, would have to prove that the consent of children may meet the criteria of voluntariness and information, but also the criterion of competence. Not only Children (roughly 13 years of age) may be required to take on sexual relations wise decisions competently but this seems rather implausible (and is in fact nowhere substantiated by empirical research).

In this criticism is not doubted that the consent of the child sexual contacts with adults is invalid - what is questioned is whether the lack of valid consent on the part of the child actually makes such contacts indeed morally wrong.

Typical of this criticism is that examples are put forward which is believed to show that the consent argument is unsound. These so-called counter-examples without exception to non-sexual contact between adults and children (including the child to participate in religious practices, the child undergo a medical treatment or a child to follow a particular school), which the child can accept not valid but which nevertheless morally permissible or, indeed, morally desirable and sometimes even morally obligatory. By working with such counterexamples is this counter-argument is a typical example of a reductio ad absurdum, as perhaps even more clearly by the following argument scheme:

• Suppose that sexual contacts between adults and children are morally wrong because of the fact that the child cannot accept it as valid. Consequently, non-sexual contact between adults and children that the child canot accept valid morally wrong. But in fact, many of these contacts completely morally acceptable. 
  So to sexual contact between adults and children are not morally wrong because of the fact that the child cannot accept it as valid.

At first glance, this seems completely a counter-argument to get the consent argument below - and that is the intention of the authors who make this argument (Leahy, 1996; Ehman, 2000; Kershnar, 2001). What I want to show is that slimmed the consent argument does is indeed valid. When we, much like we have done in the damage claim, limit the scope of the consent argument to a certain subclass of sexual contact between adults and children, then the argument turns out to be the reductio ad absurdum.

Which subclass is it? 
What is striking, but paradoxically so far not been noted is that all counterexamples that
are fired on the consent argument, adults figure who share certain characteristics. Without exception, the adults, or persons with parental authority over the child in question, or persons with parental authority have permission to do certain things things with the child's consent. 
Whether it comes to the education of the child, the initiation of the child in religious practices, the medical treatment of the child, or the child's participation in sports activities, we always assume that the adults involved the parents of the child or, where that is not the case, persons who are parents have been given in some way with their child to get the green light as a teacher, a priest, a doctor or a sports trainer.

The person with parental authority is not always the parent of the child, let alone the biological parent. And not just the parents of the child, but also the government has to give permission to competent persons to do certain things with the child. For convenience, I will, however, those with parental responsibility call ‘the parents’, and the person with whom the parents have agreed to conduct ‘the authorized person’.

But why do all these counterexamples exclusively relate to the child's parents or authorized adults? 
Because it is only then that counter-examples are actual examples. If we were to change the parents or authorized persons in adults without parental care or parental authorization, the status of the adults involved, the counter-argument becomes contradictious and will completely lose its power. That's because the change in status is accompanied by a radical change of the moral status of that contact between the adult and the child.

As we have seen, the critical force of the counter-examples lies precisely in the fact that they relate to interactions between adults and children, even if the child is unable to be valid to agree, it is morally perfectly legitimated. But if we imagine that the adults involved neither the parents nor authorized persons, then the same interactions are morally wrong, at least prima facie.

• In normal circumstances, a dentist cannot treat a child without the consent of the 
  parents; 
• to bring children to church or mosque without parental consent is morally unacceptable, and 
• giving the child jujitsu training without first asking permission of the parents
  cannot morally by the bracket.

The question that then arises is why precisely the status change of the adults involved contacts with the child does change [PAGE 89] morally legitimate morally illegitimate.

What is the status change after the wrong-making feature? 
The answer to this question is obvious: what makes such contacts than morally wrong is that the child is not valid to accept, and especially not valid because the child, precisely because it's a child, lacks the capacity to meet the competency criteria. Because what if the child of the counter-examples would be an adult, that is, someone who is supposed to be competently to decide, not a child but an adult. When that person had given permission to this treatment by the dentist, the going to church or mosque, or martial 
arts training, then, his or her agreement is not morally wrong.

If my analysis of the counterexamples makes sense, then we can, about sexual contact between adults and children, draw the following conclusions.

To the extent that the adult in question has received no consent from the parents of the child, then is the sex morally wrong because the child lacks the competence to vote valid. Regarding this subclass of sexual contacts, i.e. unauthorized sexual contact between adults and children, the consent argument is completely correct and the counter-argument fails. But when parents do have consented to the sexual contact, it is just the opposite, the counterargument is effective, and the consent argument unsound. Because what might be wrong with authorized sexual contact between adults and children, the counter examples clearly show that the consent of the child cannot be invalid.

Much like we did with the injury argument, we can ‘save the consent argument 'save' the scope by limiting the scope of the argument, in this case to sexual contact between unauthorized adults and children. But just as the restricted version of the damage argument is substantially different than the standard version, this constrained version of the consent argument essentially different from the version that is put forward standard in the relevant literature.

Conscientious parenting

When we combine the main results of my evaluations of the standard arguments, the following picture emerges.

For two subclasses of sexual contact between adults and children, we can have a non-moral feature designate that makes such contacts morally wrong.

• In the first sub-class, which includes sexual relations where the child will not voluntarily participate, it is wrong-making feature the real risk of harm. Even if the adult concerned permission is granted by the parents in such cases the fact that the child is a real risk of being harmed is sufficient to explain the sex morally unacceptable.
• In the second sub-class, which consists of sexual contact with an adult who does not have parental consent, the wrong-making is characterized by the fact that the child cannot accept valid. Even if the child does on such contacts voluntarily and experience the positive such contacts, the fact that the child is not competent to be to agree to make such sex nevertheless morally wrong. 

In other words, what these subclasses of sexual contact between adults and children, the widely shared feelings of moral disapproval can be justified - so far so good.

It will be understood, however, that these two sub-classes do not cover all cases of sex between adults and children. There is a third subclass of such contacts to identify, namely those contacts where the child willingly participates and the adult concerned the green light has been given to those with parental authority. And the question is: 

• What is the wrong-making feature of this subclass of sexual contacts? That cannot be the real risk of damage nor the incompetence of the child. But what then?
• Or should we come to the conclusion that sexual relations are not morally wrong, and so intuitive that widespread moral revulsion which this subclass, it is unfounded? 
  [* 8]

• [*8] This is indeed the conclusion Kershnar (2001): "pedophilia is wrong if and only if it is harmful or the child's parents do not agree to it" (p. 111), "If adult-child sex is harmless and the child's parents consent to it, then it is probably morally permissible" (p. 129).

To find an answer to this question, I would like to address a factor in my evaluation of the consent argument plays a deeper prominent role: parental authority.

As authority in general, we can understand the parental authority as a right or power, in this case the right to supposedly deputy for the child, to make decisions and tune behavior of the child to those decisions. However, this right of parents is not absolute or unconditional. It is a right that is based on, and therefore is limited by a parental duty, especially the duty to defend interests of the child at the same time. That is a duty that can be split into two sub-duties analytically.

• One is the duty to protect the interests of the child that is to make sure that conditions occur which will harm interests of the child.
• The other is the duty to promote the interests of the child that is to ensure that conditions occur that will come benefit to the interests of the child.

Now, parents who this dual role responsibility to properly fulfill, we can call conscientious parents. 
And what I would suggest is that sexual relations between adults and children are not only morally wrong when parents have withheld their consent to those contacts - even if that parental consent was given, but would not be allowed if the parents their authority had exercised in a conscientious manner, such sexual contacts morally unacceptable. In other words, in addition to the voluntary participation of the child is not just simply the fact that the parents have consented necessary to make such contacts morally permissible but that the agreement testifies, or is at least compatible with, conscientious parenting.

The question that arises is: should ever conscientious parents or another adult giving permission to deal with their sexual contacts [PAGE 91] with their child?
We would have a positive answer to this question by assuming that conscientious
parenting by definition is incompatible with such consent.

• But is not that too easy strategy?
• Should we not recognize that under certain circumstances, such as when the child clearly indicates that they would like to contact, parental consent can attest conscientious exercise of authority or at least not as it is contrary?
• Rather or, indeed, that there are situations to point, how extraordinary perhaps, that the refusal of consent would demonstrate a lack of conscientious parenthood?

Whatever the answer to these difficult questions, it is indisputable that conscientious parents will not agree to sexual relations where the child does not want to participate. That would be in flagrant breach of their duty to protect interests of the child.
But when the child wants to enter into sexual, conscientious parents have plenty of reasons to be restraint giving their consent. So they will wonder whether their child sexual contact wants real self.

• Here is the will of the child, bearing in mind the observation of Primoratz that children tend to regard adults as authorities do not much like the reflex of what the adult concerned?
• And that adult really be trusted? 
• Who can guarantee or control that person still will not do things that go against the wishes of the child?

Moreover, conscientious parents will realize that their child's sexual contacts with adults are not characterized by a mutual sexual desire. What the adult in the child seeks, namely some form of sexual gratification, is not wanted by the child in the adult. Isn’t here the danger lurking that the adult concerned into his desire for sexual gratification, things will expect the child to stand, but does not dare to refuse?

But even when conscientious parents conclude that their child really wants the sexual contact itself and the adult is completely trustworthy, then they will have their reservations. Such parents will not only ask whether the sexual contact will harm the child, but also whether that contact the child will benefit. Their reasoning is not, even though it does not run, it does not harm, but rather, it should also benefit although not hurt it.

As conscientious parents some adults give permission to go to certain (non-sexual) contact with their child that they will do to protect or to promote the interests of their child. But because of the lack of reciprocity in sexual contact between adults and children, it is unclear which interest of the child is promoted, let alone that such contacts are needed to protect the interests of the child through such contacts [* 9]

• [*9] For the lack of reciprocity: see Primoratz, 1999, p. 107, 2006, p. 759, and in particular also Thomas, 2002. Because of that lack of reciprocity, Thomas writes, "no adult has reason to believe that, in having sex with a child, he is by the sex act alone making the child better off in any way" (p. 186). This lack of reciprocity does not explain that in a broad sense of 'sexuality' children can have sexual desires and sexual pleasure can experience (cf. De Graaf & Rademakers, 2003, pp. 6-9.). But that infantile sexuality is fundamentally different from adult sexuality. 
  Typical of the sexuality of persons in biological terms, adults are the well-known sexual response cycle (successively the excitement phase, the plateau phase, orgasmic phase and the return phase). 
  It is difficult to maintain that this cycle is also characteristic of infantile sexuality.

I suspect that all these considerations make it sufficiently clear that the consent of 
conscientious parents with sexual contact between the child and an adult is very unlikely, even if a real risk of harm to the child actually absent and so we can hardly speak of sexual abuse. 
Intuitive moral disapproval of such contacts, even if the child is voluntarily participating, and the parents have consented, therefore seems justified, because the probability is high that such consent would not be given if the parents would have been conscientiously.

The Refences are given here in a separate PDF file: steutel_2009_references.pdf

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